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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
J.A.JIES L ... \TSES and 
J ... :\.~IES SDRALES, 
vs. 
~ICK FLOOR, INC., 
Appellants, 
Case No. 6237 
Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On and prior to September 25, 1933, down, to May 31, 
1939, the property involved in this suit, 79 West 2nd 
South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, was owned: W. P. 
Noble Company one half, Ford E. Hovey and Willard li. 
Dressler, Trustees, one-fourth and William Frederick 
Bragg, Robert Russell Bragg, Frederick Ingham Bragg, 
Laura Lillian Harkins and Laura I. Bragg, one-fourth 
and, on May 31, 1939, they conveyed it by general war-
ranty deed, with a special warranty of immediate posses-
sion to the plaintiffs, who on June 2, 1939, served a notice 
on the defendant to deliver up to plaintiffs the possession 
of said premises on or before July 1, 1939. The defend-
ant having refused to deliver possession of said premises 
to the plaintiffs, they brought this suit in unlawful de-
tainer. (Ab. 1) The defendant answered, alleging that 
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2 
on September 25, 1933, it entered into a written agree-
lnent with the Stockyards National Bank of South 
Omaha, a corporation, theW. P. Noble Company, a cor-
poration, and the Fred Bragg Estate, as lessors, executed 
by A. H. Ball, Agent, whereby said lessors leased the 
premises, 79 West 2nd South Street, to the defendant for 
three years at a monthly rental of $75.00 a month; that 
said lease agreement provided that if the defendant 
should, prior to May 25, 1935, expend $1,000.00 in per-
manent improvements he could lease said premises for 
an additional five years at a monthly rental of $90.00 
a month, and that defendant had made such expenditure 
and election. Defendant further alleged in its answer 
that said lease provides, ''either party agrees to pay all 
costs and attorney's fees and expenses incurred by the 
other that shall arise from enforcing the covenants of 
this lease, ''and alleged that $500.00 was a reasonable 
attorneys' fee. 
The alleged lease is attached as an exhibit (A b. 11). 
The plaintiffs, in their reply, admitted that Ball had 
signed the alleged lease, and denied he had any authority 
from the owners, or any of them, and alleged the lease is 
void under the provisions of Sections 33-5-1 and 33-5-3, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and denied that the de-
fendant had expended $1,000.00 on permanent improve-
ments on said pr~mises or that it had exercised its option 
to extend said alleged lease. 
The defendant then filed a pleading, alleging the 
plaintiffs were estopped from denying Ball's authority 
because the rent had been paid as provided in the lease 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
and that the O\Yners all kne\Y defendant had expended 
$1,000.00 on improve1nents and that plaintiffs and their 
predecessors kne\Y of the lease and in1proven1ents and 
had ratified the actions of A. H. Ball. (Ab. 18). 
To this the plaintiffs, in their second reply, adn1it-
ted the receipt of the rent and denied all other allega-
tions. (A b. 20). 
ASSIGNl\1ENT OF ERRORS 
The appellants assign forty-two errors on which they 
seek a reversal. They may be summarized as follo,vs : 
The court erred in receiving in evidence the alleged 
lease, exhibit 28 (Ab. 76); Assignment No. 17 (Ab. 116); 
Exhibits 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, (Ab. 26, 30); Assignment No. 
17 (Ab. 116), and Exhibits 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 
and 40 (Ab. 90-96); Assignments No. 21 (Ab. 117) and 
Exhibits 5, 4, 4-A, 2, 6, 7, 7 -A, 8, 9, 10, 1, 3, 10-A, 11, 
12, 13, 14 (Ab. 54-56). Assignment No. 10 (Ab. 115); 
Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 (A b. 59) ; 
Assignment No. 10 (Ab. 115). 
The court erred in overruling plaintiffs' objection 
to testimony (Ab. 45, 101), Assignments Nos. 1 to 28 
(A b. 114-117), and especially the wide scope of cross 
examination of witness, R. Gould-Smith (Ab. 46-61), 
Assignments Nos. 1-21 (Ab. 114-116); the direct examin-
ation questions to A. H. Ball over plaintiffs' objection 
(Ab. 68-80), Assignments 12-17; and overruling of obj.ec-
tion to testimony of Nick Floor (A b. 88-101), Assign~ 
ments No. 17 to 28 (Ab. 116-118); overruling the objec-
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4 
tion to evidence of H. Arnold Rich (Ab. 98.), Assignment 
No. 26 (Ab. 117). 
The court erred : 
In making each and every one of its findings of fact, 
1 to 9 inclusive (Ab. 22-36); Assignments Nos. 29 to 36, 
inclusive, (Ab. 118-120). 
In making each and every one of its conclusions of 
law, 1 to 5, inclusive, (Ab. 37-39); Assignments No. 37-41 
inclusive, (A b. 120). 
In rendering judgment in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiffs (Ab. 39); Assignments No. 42 (Ab. 
121) and rendering judgment for attorney's fees. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
The questions involved are : 
1. Was the alleged three year lease valid (A b. 11) 
which purported to be executed by the Stockyards Na-
tional Bank of South Omaha, W. P. Noble Company and 
the Fred Bragg Estate, by A. H. Ball, Agent, when it 
was stipulated (Ab. 44) the owners, at the time the lease 
was .executed, were W. P. Noble Company, a corporation, 
one-half interest, Ford E. Hovey and Willard H. Dress-
ler, Trustees, one-fourth interest, William Frederick 
Bragg, Robert Russell Bragg, Frederick Ingham Bragg, 
Laura Lillian Harkins and Laura I. Bragg one-fourth 
interest, and when it was pleaded that the lease was 
void under the statute of frauds, sections 33-5-1, and 
33-5-3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 and it was object-
ed to because one co-tenant could not give a valid lease to 
the whole property~ 
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n1ents of the Ynlue of $1,000.00 on the leased prPnli~·H~.; 
prior to ~lay :23, 1935, and eleet to continue said lease 
fiYe additional years, ns \Yns provided in said alleged 
lease·? 
3. If the lease is held to be valid, was the defendant 
entitled to recover attorneys' fees against the grantees 
of only one of the parties (the W. P. Noble Con1pany), 
designated as lessors in said alleged lease, and the plain-
tiffs' herein~ 
I. 
THE ALLEGED LEASE WAS VOID BECAUSE 
A. H. BALL \VAS NOT AUTHORIZED IN 
\\:RITING TO EXECUTE A LEASE. 
A. H. Ball testified that his father, who died in June, 
1930, had collected the rentals on the Eagle Block for 
many years and that Walker T. Gunter acted with his 
father in handling the affairs of the building and he 
signed all leases as witness (A b. 69). That for several 
months during his father's illness, under Mr. Gunter's 
orders, he had collected the rentals and made the reports 
of rentals collected. (Ab. 70, 71). And he saw Mr. 
Gunter as a rule, every day in connection with the estate~. 
(Ab. 71). That at the time of his father's death Mr. 
Gould-Smith of the Noble Company came to the funeral. 
While he was here, "We met with Mr. Gunter at his 
office and Mr. Gould-Smith said, 'Just take and handle 
the property as my father had' (Ab. 80) I wrote Mr. 
Gould-Smith of things to be done in connection with 
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building. I consulted with Mr. Gunter all the time, (Ab. 
81), and in a conversation with Mr. Gould-Smith at Miss 
Noble's home, he said 'Go ahead and collect the rents and 
they would decide later what they were going to do.'" 
When Mr. Gould-Smith left for home he said, "You go 
right on and do things as your father had." (Ab. 86) 
''Walker T. Gunter wrote a letter to each, The 
Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha, Mr. Brome 
an attorney in Wyoming to whom rent due the Bragg~ 
was transmitted, and Mr. Gould-Smith, advising that I be 
continued. I saw the letters he received in reply or he 
read them to me. I saw a letter from Mr. Smith. The 
letters advised Mr. Gunter that ''I knowing all about the 
property, and he advised it would be logical to have me 
go and handle the work, the same as my father had.'' 
(Ab. 72). "I think the letter from Mr. Brome was 
written in long hand. I think it was signed C. L. Brome. 
I can't say whether the Bragg Estate was mentioned in 
the letter. I would say that Dressler's letter was type-
written. I couldn't say that the Stockyards National 
Bank of South Omaha was mentioned. Mr. Hovey's name 
was not mentioned in this letter." (Ab. 86). 
''The letter from Mr. Smith was received by me in 
August or September and I gave it to Mr. Gunter. My 
wife saw it." (A b. 82.) Mrs. Ball said she read the letter 
which stated, "he was very sorry on the death of Art's 
father and asked if Art would continue to carry on the 
'vork that his father had previously done. That was all 
there was in it. I don't think it mentioned the Eagle 
Block." (Ab. 84) Mr. Ball testified that the letters had 
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been burned or destroyed by Mr. Gunter's folks after his 
death. 
Then ~lr. Ball produced exhibits 25, 26 and 27, which 
purported to be leases on parts of the Eagle Block, lea.~­
ing store roo1ns for three years, which had been signed 
by H. T. Ball and witnessed by Walker T. Gunter, and, 
over plaintiffs' objection, the court received in evidence 
these leases, (Ab. 74; Assignment No. 17, Ab. 116). 
Mr. Dressler said, ''I don't think I wrote a letter to 
A. H. Ball, after his father's death, that I desired or re-
quested said A. H. Ball to collect the rents and look after 
the property as his father had done". (Ab. 62). 
1Ir. Gould-Smith testified he was secretary and 
treasurer of the W. P. Noble Company, and resides in 
San Francisco. That Mr. H. T. Ball had collected the 
rentals of the Eagle Block since 1909. ''Shortly after his 
death, in June, 1930, Mr. Gunter a.nd I verbally employed 
his son, A. H. Ball as agent. Mr. Gunter died September 
23, 1933. Until his death, he and I were consulted on all 
matters of importance, and after his death Mr. Ball con-
sulted with me by mail frequently. Mr. Ball was allowed 
$60.00 a month. He reported his collections monthly and 
reported the collections by the street number, not by 
the name of the tenant. He never mentioned he gave a 
lease." (Ab. 51). 
While the direct examination of Mr. Gould-Smith 
had been limited, the court, over plaintiffs' objection, 
threw wide open the cross examination. (Ab. 45-62; 
Assignments Nos. 1 to 13, Ab. 114, 115), and permitted 
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the questions to go far afield from the subject of the 
direct exan1ina tion. 
There is not a scintilla of evidence that the Senior 
Ball ever had written authority to make leases. The 
testimony was that he and Mr. Gunter made a few leases 
for a period exceeding a year. Under the authorities, 
this was not any proof of written authorization to A. H. 
Ball to execute this lease. The case of Darke v. Smith, 
14 Utah 35, 45 P. 1006 is decisive. We quote from p. 1009: 
"The defendant testified that in April, 1884, 
he received a letter from his father, who was then 
in Arizona, and afterwards lost it in moving. Jane 
L. Smith testified that she read the letter; that it 
was Lot Smith's \vriting; that her son let her 
read it; that intestate stated in it that he wanted 
the defendant to take possession of the land, and 
make him a home, and he would give him a deed to 
it; that the letter mentioned the land. It referred 
to the land he owned in Weber. He owned other 
land there. T'vo other witnesses corroborate the 
defendant and Jane L. Smith in some material 
respects. While the letter, as remembered by the 
\vitnesses, does not contain a description of the 
land in dispute, or refer to it with reasonable cer-
tainty, the testimony of the witnesses, taken in 
connection with the letter, indicates that the land 
in dispute was intended. We think this letter was 
not sufficiently definite and certain as a writing 
to take the transaction out of the statute of 
frauds.'' 
In Abba v. Smyth, a Utah case, 59 P. 756, 21 Utah 
109, the first paragraph of the syllabus is as follows: 
"Under section 2647, Rev. St., unless the es-
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sential tern1s of the contraet can be deter1nined 
fron1 the contrnet itself, it is 'Yithin thP statute of 
frauds; and, if thus defeetive, the defect cannot 
be supplied by parol proof, for by adn1itting 
parol testin1ony to supply the essential parts of 
the contract, "'ould be to restore the 1nischief 
"~hich the enactment of the statute of frauds vvas 
framed to prevent.'' 
In Adan1s v. ~Ianning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465, the 
fourth paragraph of the syllabus is as follows: 
'' vVhere a contract for the sale of 30 acres of 
land did not designate the property, and the 
grantor owned considerable land, mere possession 
of a particular parcel by letting stock graze there-
on will not take the case out of the statute of 
frauds by identifying the land. ' ' 
"A written memorandum stating that it is 
agreed by the parties that each of them can sell 
certain lots, 'and each party has the privilege to 
sell each lot at $250.00, which shall pay Mr. Ringer 
in full for said lots, and if sale is not made within 
16 days Mr. H. is to pay to Mr. Ringer the ori-
ginal price agreed upon' betwen them is insuffi-
cient, within the statute of frauds, when the agree-
ment as to the original price is oral." Syllabus 
Ringer v. Holtzclaw, 20 S. W. 800 
''Where, in an assignment of a lease, there is 
no agreement by the assignor to put the assignee 
in possession of the leased property, oral evidence 
is not permissible to show that prior to the execu-
tion of the assignment the assignor made such 
agreement. Parol evidence is not permissible to 
supply defects in a written contract, which, by the 
statute of frauds, is required to be in writing." 
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Syllabus, Boyd v. Paul, 28 S. W. 171. 
''The written authorization from the owner, 
in order that it may be sufficient to permit the 
owner to enter into a binding contract of lease, 
must express within its terms the intention of the 
owner to confer upon the agent complete author-
ity to do so. The mere employment by the owner 
of an agent to lease his real property will usually 
be held insufficient as a grant of power to execute 
a binding lease. '' 
27 C. J. 298, last par. sec. 376 
An agent received from an owner of a lot 
a letter asking the agent ''to see what he could do 
about selling the lot'', etc., but it did not authorize 
the agent to sell the lot. Agent made written con-
tract to sell the lot to Lennox and recorded the 
contract. A day or two later the owner of the lot 
sold it to Johnson who entered upon the property 
and made valuable improvemens. Lennox sued 
Johnson, et al to compel specific performance. He 
lost his case. 
Court held the letter gave the agent no power 
or authority to sell the lot and further held that 
one dealing with an agent was bound at his peril 
to learn the extent of the agent's authority. 
Johnson v. Lennox, 133 P. 744 (Colo.) 
In the case of Salter v. I ves, et al, (Cal.) 155 P. 84, 
the owner of the property wrote to an agent authorizing 
him to negotiate a lease and setting forth the terms of the 
lease, and it was held that the mere employment by the 
owner of an agent to sell or lease the property is usually 
insufficient as a grant of power to execute a binding con-
veyance or lease, and it was further held that a binding 
lease must be executed by the owners. 
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.... \n agent, "'"ith oral authority to sell land, wrote to 
his principal that he had sold a part of it and the princi-
pal made a deed for the land sold and \YTote the agent, 
''I a1n glad you have sold 80 acres; no\v sell the 40. '' It 
\Yas held that this ''is "'"holly insufficient to constitute 
such a written memorandum of the contract of sale as 
"Tould have bound Feger"* * * *"It was wholly insuffi-
cient to identify the 40 acres intended to be sold. And 
although both the principal and the agent n1ay have 
understood that it was the 40 acres of the principal's 
farm that lay south of the road, that fact lies wholly out-
side of the written authority, and cannot be added to it 
by parol.'' 
Johnson v. Fecht, 83 S. W. 1077 (p. 
1079) 
"A letter to an agent, saying, 'As you stated 
you could get $30,000 for the place you occupy 
* * * * and if you can, we will sell at that price 
• • • * and allow you two and one-half per cent on 
said price-merely authorizes the .agent to find a 
purchaser, but not to sell; and a contract by the 
agent to sell confers no rights on the purchaser.'' 
Syllabus, Grant v. Ede, 24 P. 890 
On certain property a company was given ''the full 
management and. control thereof, with power to collect 
the rents and income therefrom, to pay the taxes, insur-
ance premiums and other fixed charges incident thereto 
and to make all necessary repairs and to do all other 
things which second party (the Guardian Savings & 
Trust Co.) deems necessary or advisable in the proper 
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management of said property.'' The court held this was 
insufficient, saying: 
"It is significant, too, that nowhere in the 
enumeration of the powers delegated to the agent 
is any express power conferred to execute any 
lease whatever'' * * * * 
Lithograph Bldg. Co. v. Watt, 117 
N. E., p. 28 
The owner of land wrote his attorney, saying he 
would take $200.00 £or certain timber land, if removed 
in a year, and "if this is satisfactory to the buyers you 
may close the deal.'' Held, this is not sufficient authority 
for the agent to make a contract of sale. The court said: 
"We are of the opinion that the authority of 
a real estate agent or broker to bind the principal 
by a contract of sale should clearly and unequi-
vocally appear before the latter can be held." 
LaPlant v. Loveland, 170 N. W. 920 
''The contract must be complete in itself and 
leave nothing to rest in parol. And it must be cer-
tain and definite as to the parties, property, con-
sideration, premises and time of performance.'' 
Cooper v. Pierson, 180 N. W. 351 
Other authorities holding that the mere employment 
of an agent to rent real property does not authorize the 
agent to enter into a long-term lease, are: 
Miller v. Shaw, 195 P. 743 
Campbell v. Galloway, 47 N. E. 620 
Perky v. Harding, 123 N. W. 69 
Farley v. Fair, 256 P. 1031 
It is apparent that Ball's authority, being in parol, 
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he could not grant a lease for n1ore ,than one year without 
the 'Yritten approval of his principals. Gunter's approval 
had ahYays been secured by Ball's father, and by Ball, 
prior to this lease. 
To summarize briefly, the evidence as to the con-
tents of the alleged letters shows conclusively that they 
were insufficient as a writing because, (a) they did not 
identify the property. Ball testified they said "for him 
to carry on as his father did.'' He did not testify that 
they named the property. Mrs. Ball testified that she 
could not recall whether ''Eagle Block'' was mentioned 
in the alleged Smith letter. Therefore, the description 
of the property would have to be supplied by oral testi-
mony, which under the authorities cited, is not admiss-
able; (b) To "carry on as his father did," there is no 
evidence that the father had any written authority and 
it is a novel proposition to say that while the agent act-
ing did not have written authority he may act because he 
is authorized to act as his predecessor did, even though 
the predecessor had no written authority. Under the 
defendant's contention, Ball could have made a lease for 
99 years as well as f.or 8 years. There is no limitation to 
this authority which it is alleged jumps from father to 
son and gains force with each jump. So we have here 
the whole question of authority to be supplied by oral 
evidence and nothing intimating that the father had 
written authority. Therefore, it follows conclusively that 
if Ball ''may act as his father did,'' there is no evidence 
that the father had written authority; therefore, there is 
not sufficient writing to comply with the statute, and 
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even if no written authorization were required they have 
failed, because the father acted with Walker T. Gunter, 
and Gunter was not consulted here. 
(c) The evidence does not show that the alleged 
letters were signed by the owners of the property, or any 
of them. Ball testified that Gunter received a letter from 
Dressler, but did not say Dressler signed it. He did 
testify that neither Hovey nor the Stockyards National 
Bank of South Omaha was mentioned. Both Mr. and Mrs .. 
Ball testified a letter was received from Mr. Smith. 
They did not say it was signed W. P. Noble Company, by 
Mr. Smith or by Mr. Smith personally. The signatures 
of the parties are essential. None of the Braggs signed 
anything, and it was not shown that Brome, the lawyer 
to whom collections were remitted, had any authority to 
lease the property, nor were the signatures of any other 
person shown to have been subs-cribed to the mythical 
letters. 
Clearly the Court erred in overruling the plain tiffs' 
objections to the introduction of the lease (Exhibit 28) 
because there was no written authority and the parties 
nan1ed as lessors in the lease were not the owners (Ab. 
76; Assignment No. 17, Ab. 116). Clearly the court erred 
in o·verruling plaintiffs' objections to the oral evidence 
endeavoring to show authority in A. H. Ball (Ab. 67-80, 
Assignment Nos. 14 to 19, Ab. 116), and the testimony 
as to the contents of the letters (A b. 67-80, Assignment 
Nos. 14 to 19, A b. 116). 
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II. 
THE .A.LLEGED LEASE \\TAS VOID, BECAUSE IT 
\V-AS NOT EXECUTED BY OR ON BEHALF 
OF ALL THE 0\\TNERS. 
It "'"as stipulated (Ab. 44) that the owners of the 
property, at and prior to the time of the alleged lease, 
'vere the vV. P. Noble Company, a corporation, owning a 
one-half interest; \\Tillard H. Dressler and Ford E. 
Hovey, Trustees, owning a one-fourth interest; William 
Frederick Bragg, Robert Russell Bragg, Frederick Ing-
ham Bragg, Laura Lillian Harkins and Laura I. Bragg, 
owning an undivided one-fourth interest. The lessors of 
the alleged lease were the Stockyards National Bank of 
South Omaha, the W. P. Noble Company, both corpora-
tions, and the Fred Bragg estate, and these names were 
signed to the lease as lessors by A. H. Ball, Agent (Ab. 
11). 
No one co-tenant has the power to make a lease to 
the entire property without the other co-tenants. Such 
a lease would be an attempted eviction by one co-tenant 
of his co-tenants. This principle was well illustrated 
in the case of Howard v. Manning, 192 P. 358, and we 
quote paragraphs 10 and 12, beginning on page 361, as 
follows: 
"Neither of the tenants in common is entitled 
to the exclusive possession of all the land to the 
exclusion of his co-tenants, nor entitled to posses-
sion to any particular part of it. As he cannot ex-
clude his co-tenants by his own occuption of the 
land, he cannot, without their consent or ratifica-
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tion, lease all or any particular part of the land 
in such a way that his lessee will have the right 
to the exclusive possession of all the land or any 
part thereof. It is well settled that a lessee of one 
tenant in common by a lease in which the other 
tenants have not joined is, as to them, a tres-
passer so far as he occupies any portion of the 
land. The lessee of one tenant in common is a 
trespasser as to the other tenants in common, but 
the lease is not void as aginst the tenant in com-
mon executing it. Underhill on Landlord and Ten-
ant, vol. 1, sees 62 and 64; Miles v. Fink, 119 Miss. 
147, 80 South. 532; South Penn Oil Co. v. Haught, 
71 W. V a. 720, 78 S. E. 759; Watford Oil & Gas 
Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53, 122 Am. 
St. Rep. 144; Ziegler v. Brennerman, 237 Ill. 15, 
86 N. E. 597; Archer on Oil and Gas, p. 660; 
Stewart v. Tennant, 52 W. Va. 559, 44 S. E. 223. 
Neither tenant in common has, by virtue of his 
relationship to his co-tenant in common, any au-
thority to act as agent for his companion in either 
giving a lease or enforcing a forfeiture thereof. 
Freeman on Co-tenancy, and Partition, sec. 180; 
38 Cyc. p. 105; Rotzlen v. Merchants Loan & 
Trust Co. (S.D.) 170 N. W. 128; Adams v. Yukon 
Gold Co., 251 Fed. 226, 163 C. C. A. 382. 
The rule is stated possibly a little differently in the 
case of Satterlee v. Umenthum, 198, N. W. 823, and we 
quote from paragraph 1 of the opinion on page 823, as 
follows: 
''We are of the opinion that respondent, by 
virtue of the lease did, for the period of its dura-
tion, become a tenant in common with appellant's 
wards. In Tiffany on Real Property (2nd Ed.), 
p. 683, vve find the rule thus stated: 
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~ .4-\ co-tenant rannot 1uake a lease valid as 
against other eo-tenants, so as to give to the le~spe 
the right of PxclusiYe possession of any part of 
the land, unless he "·as authorized to act as their 
agent in 1naking the lease, or unless, having n1ade 
it as their agent, his act is ratified by then1. The 
effect of a lease by one cotenant, acting for him-
self alone, is at most merely to confer on the 
lessee a right to share in the possession for the 
tern1 of the lease, that is, to make the lessee a co-
tenant for the term.' " 
Our own Supreme Court in the case of Shell Oil 
Company v. Stiffler, 87 Utah 176, 48 P. (2d), 503, recog-
nizes this rule. In this case a husband and wife, as co-ten-
ants, executed a lease. Later the lessee and the husband 
made a modification of the lease without authorization 
from the wife, and the court held that the modification 
was void. 
There is also another serious defect as regards the 
lease, in this : Dressler and Hovey were trustees of a one-
fourth interest. It should be proven, and we believe it 
was not, that Dressler wrote a letter to Gunter stating 
that A. H. Ball "could carry on as his father had done," 
and if it should be asumed that this letter contained 
sufficient writing to comply with the statute of frauds, 
then the lease in question would be defective because, 
where there are trustees, all of the trustees must be 
parties to any agreement or authorization to an agent. 
The United States Supreme Court case of Winslo-vv 
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 188 U. S. 646, 47 
L. Ed. 635 was a case in which the trustees had given a 
lease, and thereafter one of the trustees executed an 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
agreement for an extension of the lease, and Mr. Justice 
Packham, speaking for the Court, said: 
''In fact, however, the lease was not legally 
rene"\ved in 1892, because the paper of that year 
was signed by one trustee only. In our opinion 
his signature did not make a valid lease. It re-
quired the signatures of all the trustees.'' 
"It is contended that the act of one of the 
trustees in signing the lease was subsequently 
ratified by the other by a recognition of its exist-
ence by long continued silence, if not by an ex-
press ratification. But an express ratification 
would consist of the signature of the other trustee 
to the paper, and of that there is no pretense. A 
ratification of an invalid instru1nent of this nature 
by recognition, we do not understand. The instru-
ment was void under the statute of frauds, be-
cause of the lack of those signatures which could 
alone render it valid as a lease for five years. 
Recognition could not take the place of the absent 
signature. Whether the conduct of the trustees, 
or of Mrs. Patterson, amounted to such a part 
performance of an invalid contract as would take 
the place of the otherwise necessary signatures 
is another question. It is difficult to see how there 
could be any technical ratification of this instru-
ment ""rithout a signing thereof by the other 
trustee. 
But, assuming that something in the nature 
of a ratification might be based upon the subse-
quent recognition, yet such recognition or ratifi-
cation must be shown to have been founded upon 
a full knowledge of all the facts. There is no evi-
dence of that kind in the case; none that the other 
trustee even knew of the existence either of the 
written paper of 1892 or that it contained a cove-
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nant to rene\Y at all for any tilne. The posses-
sion by the ron1pany and the paytnPnt of rent 
\Yere provided for by the covenant to renew con-
tained in the lease of 1888, and hence there was a 
justification for that possession and for the pay-
nlent of the n1oney, \Yhich 'vas entirely con1patible 
'vith the non-existence of any written lease from 
1892, or of any covenant to again renew for five 
years from August 1, 1897. This possession and 
payment cannot, therefore, be used as a basis for 
the presumption of knowledge on the part of the 
trustee of the existence of the so-called lease of 
1892 or of the covenant contained therein.'' 
Our own Supreme Court, in the case of Utah Loan 
and Trust Company v. Garbutt, 6 Utah 142; 23 P. 758, 
makes the same holding with reference to the necessity 
of all the trustees joining in giving the written authori-
zation to an agent. 
James on ''Option Contracts,'' sec. 811, lays down 
the following rule: 
''The mere fact that the optioners are the 
owners of the optioned property as tenants in 
common, or as joint tenants, does not, as we have 
seen, clothe any of the tenants with power or 
authority to give an option upon the common 
property that will be binding upon any interest 
except his own. The relation of principal and 
agent does not exist between tenants so far at 
least as the right to dispose of the common prop-
erty is concerned. Nor are they partners. With 
reference to the subject matter under considera-
tion, the relation between them is not different 
from that existing between owners ·of separate 
and distinct parcels of land, with the consequence 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
that the power of one to sell or dispose of the in-
terest of the other as well as to accept or receive 
notice of election, must rest upon authority either 
impliedly or expressly granted.'' 
In the case of Landt v. Schneider, 77 P. 307, (Mont.) 
there were three lessors and the lessee claimed there had 
been a modification of the lease by one of the lessors 
acting for all, and to substantiate the defense they offer-
ed a letter written to one of the lessors by another lessor 
in behalf of himself and the other lessors, "We (Ritter 
and Buxman) have concluded that Mr. Ritter goes to 
your place and all what he agrees about the brewery in 
Maiden is all right with me.'' 
We quote further from the s.ame case : 
''This letter is signed by Geo. Buxman. Plain-
tiffs sought to show by this letter that Ritter had 
authority to enter into the agreement of Sept-
ember 20th extending the lease as the agent of 
Buxn1an. The court refused to admit the letter. 
This letter is a statement by plaintiff Landt, and 
does not purport to grant written authority to 
Ritter to contract for and on behalf of Buxman. 
Subdivision 5, sec. 2185, Civ. Code, provides that 
an agreement for leasing for a longer period than 
one year, or for the sale of real property, or for 
an interest therein, must be in writing, and such 
agreement, if made by an agent, is invalid, unless 
the authority of the agent be in writing, subscrib-
ed by the principal sought to be charged. Section 
1504, Civ. Code, provides that, \vhen an attorney 
in fact executes an instrument transferring an in-
terest in real property, he must subscribe the 
name of his principal to it, and his own name as 
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attorney in faet. Ritter had no \Yritten authority, 
as appears fron1 this record, to contract for Bux-
nlan: nor is Buxn1an 's narne signed to thP agree-
nlent extending the tin1e of this lease. This lease 
and agreement of extension also en1body an agree-
Inent for the sale and conveyance of this land to 
defendant. Under the facts here presented, this 
alleged agreement of Buxman 's amounts to noth-
inb more than a parol agreement to extend the 
tern1s of the "\vritten lease and agreement to con-
vey for more than one year beyond the date "\Vhen 
the contract of extension was entered into.'' 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT ACT IN GOOD 
FAITH, AS HE HAD NOT ONLY CONSTRUC-
TIVE BUT ACTUAL NOTICE THAT BALL 
WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE 
SUCH A LEASE. 
Nick Floor testified that at the time he secured the 
lease he consulted with and submitted it to an attorney, 
Mr. Knowlton. (Ab. 106, 107). He did not say what the 
attorney advised him, nor did he produce the attorney 
as a witness to testify that he had advised him that 
the lease was in due form and would be a binding obliga-
tion. We must b.elieve that he was told of the infirmities 
in the lease. A. H. Ball purported to sign as the agent 
of a bank in another state, the agent of a Utah corpora-
tion, and the agent of an estate. This was an 8-year 
lease. Any lawyer would have asked, ''Has Ball written 
authorization from the bank; have the duly authorized 
officials of the Utah Corporation excuted a power of 
attorney appointing Ball agent, with power to lease the 
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property~" And then we have the "Fred Bragg estate." 
Is there an order of court authorizing Mr. Ball to lease 
the property of the Estate~ Eight years is a long time 
to tie up the property of an estate. No lawyer could have 
failed to warn Mr. Floor of these facts and advised him 
of the necessity of securing proof of Mr. Ball's authority. 
The law cast on Mr. Floor the duty to ascertain 
these facts. Any lawyer would know Mr. Ball's authority 
must be in writing. The lawyer must have advised Mr. 
Floor accordingly. The duty was cast on Floor to as-
certain the authority of Ball and he cannot evade that 
duty by saying he did not know. The authorities all hold 
that the duty is cast upon the lessee to determine the au-
thorization of the person who purports to act for the 
principals. 
2 C. J ., p. 565, sec. 207, lays down the rule thusly: 
''\Vhere a third person dealing with an agent 
has knowledge that his authority must necessarily 
be in writing in order to bind the principal, it is 
his duty to ascertain whether the agent has such 
authority and whether it is in proper form; and 
where there is written authority, whether it is re-
quired or not, and such person has, or is charged 
with, knowlQdge thereof, it is his duty to ascertain 
the nature and extent of the authority conferred, 
and whether the agent is acting within its scope, 
unless he is excused from inspecting the written 
authority by a statement from the principal him-
self defining the authority. When the authority is 
by law required to be in writing he is charged 
with knowledge of the fact, and of the limitations 
upon the agent's power contained in such writ-
ing.'' 
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This rule is confirmed in 2 C. J. S., p. 1191, (Note 
7 4) as follo'NS: 
H So it is in any situation "\Yh(1l'e the agent's 
power is by la'v required to be contained or ex-
pressed in "\vriting; in such a situation, a third 
person is affected by notice of the existence and 
the contents of the power, alike whether he does 
or does not knovv of such n1a tters. '' 
THERE ''7" AS NON-EVIDENCE OF ESTOPPEL 
OR RATIFICATION 
The defendant alleged that it had paid the rent 
according to the terms of the said lease and that the 
plaintiffs' predecessors had received the rent, which 
plaintiffs admitted. The defendant further alleged that 
the original lessors had notice of the lease and of the fact 
that defendant, in reliance thereon, had spent $1,000.00 
in permanent improvements. This is. denied. A. H. Ball 
carefully concealed from the owners the fact of the 
Floor lease. On October 20, 1933, Mr. Ball wrote Mr. 
Gould-Smith: "I have delayed sending the report for 
September on the Eagle Building, hoping I would have 
something definite to say with respect to 79 West 2nd 
South * * * * We have a good man in 79, and I feel that 
things will be all right on the corner now." (A b. 52). 
The monthly reports of collections merely reported the 
monthly payments of "79 West 2nd South." When 
Gould-Smith and Dressler visited Salt Lake City, Mr. 
Ball told them nothing of the lease. The letters and 
Inonthly reports submitted by Mr. Ball never mentioned 
the giving of leases. (Exhibits 4 to 23 ; A b. 54-60). 
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11r. Dressler testified he visited Salt Lake City in 
November, 1937, and went to the Eagle Block with Mr. 
Ball, but did not go inside, and was told nothing as to 
tenants. (Ab. 63-65). 
Mr. Gould-Smith testified he came to Salt Lake City 
tv,To or three times a year. "Occasionally I would go 
do·vv-n with !!r. Ball and look at the Eagle Block." Ball 
'vould say, "I have got a tenant for such and such a 
place.'' We discussed repairs. I noticed no change in 
1934 and 1935, only that it looked older. (Ab. 45-48). 
Mr. Ball testified that Mr. Gould-Smith· was here 
several times. ''We would walk over to the Eagle Build-
ing, and he would look at it from the outside, and he 
said 'Carry on as you are.' I pointed out to Mr. Gould-
Smith that the tenant, at his own expense, had put in 
'just a little strip of tile'' on West Temple Street, under 
the window. I told Mr. Smith I thought we had a ¥ery 
good man in there and I was sure we would get the 
rent," to which Mr. Smith said, "Fine." 
''None of the Bragg heirs came. Mr. Dressler came 
in the Fall of '36 or the Spring of '37. I showed him the 
property and he said it needed a lot of improvements, 
and I said, 'Yes.' Nothing was said about any leases or 
who was occupying it. I don't think anything was said to 
Mr. Smith about leases." (Ab. 78) 
There is no basis for estoppel or ratification. There 
can be neither without a full knowledge of all of the 
facts. A. H. Ball showed in his testimony, respecting the 
visits of these principals, that his treachery to his princi-
pals in making the Floor lease and not reporting it, was 
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continuing. He led ~lr. Gould-Smith to believe that the 
tenant, at his o'Yn expense, had put in "A little strip of 
tile.'' This sho"\vs clearly that Ball's failure to disclose 
to his principals the fact of the Floor lease was not mere 
oversight, but deliberate betrayal of the interest of his; 
principals. It 'vas the duty of Ball to tell them the facts. 
The principals, having full confidence, in Ball, made no 
inquiry and the principals were lulled into security that 
their agent was not unfaithful to his duties. Query: 
\\1 as Ball acting to protect Floor by concealing the lease~ 
So long as the principals did not kno'v of the lease Floor 
was secure, but if he had disclosed the fact he knew his 
services would be terminated and Floor's lease termin-
ated. He knew that Gould-Smith had told him, in April, 
1933, he wanted to keep the building free and intact; that 
there might be a chance to sell it (Ab. 61, 62 and 110). 
He testified, ''I knew in 1937 that some of the owners 
wanted to sell. I received the original of Exhibit F in 
May, 1936. I knew some of the owners wanted to sell. I 
didn't call the attention of anyone that I had given a 
lease which would not expire until 1941." (Ab. 87). 
Willard H. Dressler testified the first he knew of 
the Floor lease was when he received a notice from the 
plaintiffs, dated June 9, 1939, that Floor claimed a lease 
(Ab. 64) and that he immediately wrote Ball. Ball testi-
fied that Dressler wrote a letter exhibiting surprise. ''I 
got the impression from the letter that Mr. Dressler 
knew nothing about the lease, that he considered this 
thing a racket.'' ''I didn't tell Mr. Dressler there was a 
lease. I don't know why I didn't tell him in my letter 
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of July 15, 1939, that I had previously told him about the 
lease in '36 or '37. '' 
The disloyalty of Ball continued to the last. Know-
ing his principals were selling the property he gave no 
notice to them of the lease and permitted them to give 
a general warranty deed with a special warranty, war-
ranting immediate possession. He did his utmost to pro-
tect Floor, to the detriment of his principals, to the last. 
The case of Jones v. Mutual Creamery qompany, 
17 P. (2d), 256, 81 Utah, 223, is conclusive. The judg-
ment was unanimous. We quote from the opinion written 
by Justice Straup, as follows: 
"It is well recognized that, in order that a 
ratification of an unauthorized act or transaction 
of an agent or of another may be valid and bind-
ing, it is essential that the principal or the person 
making the ratification had full knowledge at the 
time of the ratification of all rna terial facts and 
circumstances relative to the unauthorized act or 
transaction (2 C. J. 476), and also that an inten-
tion to ratify is essential and which must be 
shown either by an express or by an implied rati-
fication (2 C. J. 484, 492.). 
The foregoing decision is in harmony with the prac-
tically universal authority as shown by a portion of 
sections 205 and 206, 21, C. J ., beginning on page 1202, 
as follows: 
''Where a person has, with knowledge of the 
facts, acted or conducted himself in a particular 
manner, or asserted a particular claim, title or 
right, he cannot afterwards assume a position in-
consistent with such act, claim or conduct to the 
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prejudice of another \Yho has acted in reliance on 
sneh con duet or represpntation. '' 
• ~To render the rule operative it is essential 
that in taking the forn1er position the party 
against ''rhom the estoppel is claimed should have 
acted \Yith kno\vledge of his rights, and that he 
\vas a\Yare of the facts in respect of the estoppel 
claimed; also that the party invoking the estoppel 
\vas misled by the acts or conduct of the party 
against "~hom the estoppel is claimed; that he 
changed his position in reliance thereon, and was 
justified in so doing, and that he was prejudiced 
thereby, or the party against whom the estoppel 
is claimed benefitted.'' 
v. 
THERE WAS NO EXTENSION BECAUSE, (a) 
NOTICE TO BALL WAS NOT NOTICE TO THE 
PRINCIPALS; (b) DEFENDANT DID NOT 
EXPEND $1,000.00 IN PERMANENT IM-
PROVEMENTS; (c) DEFENDANT 
DID NOT, IN WRITING, AGREE 
TO THE EXTENSION. 
(a) We have this situation: Ball executed this 
lease without authority, it being a lease which the statute 
provides must be authorized in writing, and an agent 
not having written authority has no authority. Further, 
the duty is cast up·on the defendant to ascertain whether 
or not the agent had written authority. 
Restatement of Agency, 279; 
2. C. J. S., p. 1081, sec. 42 
Under these circumstances, the owners were not af-
fected by the knowledge of the agent; in fact, it was, in 
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a way, a conspiracy between the agent and the defendant, 
both knowing that the agent had no "\\Tritten authority. 
The agent carefully concealed from his principals the 
fact that a written lease had been made. His letter or 
report to Mr. Smith after the execution of the Floor 
lease, was ''We have a good man in 79. '' (A b. 52.) This 
also was erroneous, because the tenant was a corporation. 
The relationship of principal and agent is fidu-
ciary in character. The agent owes the highest duty to 
his principal and eoncealing from his principal important 
facts is as disloyal as giving erroneous information. The 
principals had correspondence with Ball respecting the 
sale of the property and Ball was contacting real estate 
agents respecting the matter. Ball knew that the prin-
cipals were selling the property, yet he never warned 
them that there was an outstanding lease, and the princi-
pals executed warranty deeds containing a rather un-
usual clause warranting immediate possession. Ball has 
been disloyal to his principals ever since September 25, 
1933; he was acting with the lessee, both had full know-
ledge that Ball had no authority. 
The presumption that an agent will notify his prin-
cipal ·of matters pertaining to the business with which he 
is entrusted is not applicable to those acts which were 
executed by the agent in disloyalty to his principal. In·· 
other words, it cannot be presumed that the agent will 
notify his principal of his own breach of duty and dis-
loyaly. The case of Dixie Guano Co. v. Wessel, 296 
Fed. 433, was a case in which the plaintiff's agent had 
been disloyal and sold goods belonging to it for his own 
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account, and after n1ore than a yPar had elapsed the 
plaintiff sued the party receiving the goods, who plead 
an estoppel and ratification, and the court held that 
there \vas no possible basis for estoppel and quoted the 
case of An1erican Surety Con1pany v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 
133, 150, and 42 L. Ed. 977, as follows : 
'"Ordinarily a corporation, like any other 
principal, is chargeable \vith the knovvledge of any 
facts \Yhich are knovvn to its agents; but in this 
case all these transactions, if there were any 
transactions of a fraudulent and dishonest char-
acter, on the part of the cashier, vvere transac-
tions for the benefit of Collins, and he was a 
participator in the fraud, and under those circum-
stances the law does not infer that the agent or 
the officer will communicate the fact to his prin-
cipal, the corporation, and under such circum-
stances the corporation is not bound by his know-
ledge. So this defense melts away and there is 
nothing of it whatever." 
This case contains quotations of a similar effect 
from many other cases and citations to many authorities. 
In the case of Lithograph Building Co. v. Watt, 117 
N. E. 25, which vve have quoted above, respecting a writ-
ten authorization which was insufficient on its face to 
authorize the lease, the court held: 
''Here the purchaser was bound to know the 
extent of the agent's authority. The contract 
made by the agent exceeded that authority, and 
the principal repudiated it as soon as he learned 
that it had been made. The case contains none 
of the elements which must be present before the 
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application of the doctrine of estoppel can be in-
sisted upon.'' 
2. C. J. S., p. 1081, sec. 42, states, 
''Where material facts are suppressed or un-
known there is no valid ratification.'' 
and on page 1083, of the same section we quote : 
''As a corollary to the rule that the principal 
must have knowledge of the material facts relat-
ing to the authorized act of his agent in order to 
ratify the same, it follows that, notwithstanding 
a principal's approval of unauthorized acts which 
have been done on his behalf by another, if the 
material facts be either suppressed or unknown 
there is no valid ratification. In this respect it is 
immaterial whether the principal's "\vant of know-
ledge is due to designed or undesigned conceal-
ment or willful misrepresentation on the part of 
the agent or his mere inadvertence, or whether 
the question of ratification arises between the 
principal and the agent or arises with respect to 
third persons. '' 
If Floor had been innocent here, that is, if he hadn't 
been under the duty of ascertaining that Ball had written 
authority, he could have sued Ball for damages. 
2 C. J.· S., page 114, sec. 208 
2 C. J. S., page 117, sec. 211 
But under the circumstances, he was negligent respecting 
a matter which it was his duty to ascertain the fact, that 
is, whether Ball had written authority to execute this 
lease. Another strange feature: Ball says he hired 
(after Gunter's death) Mr. Cluff as attorney for his 
principals (A b. 81). Now Ball, at every stage, rendered 
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such help as he could to the defendant, and the attorney 
he claims to haYe hired for his principals is in the employ 
of the defendant in this action. Under these circum-
stances, in so far as Floor "\Yas concerned, Ball did not 
represent the original O"\vners, because he carefully con-
cealed from them all the facts. Therefore, he had no 
right or authority to make any approval of the improve-
ments that Floor placed in the property, nor did he have 
any right or authority to accept notice of the renewal of 
the lease. 
2 C. J. S., p. 1078, section 39, states: 
"It is essential to ratification that the right 
to repudiate exist. 
In addition to the other essential elements of 
ratification hereafter considered in sections 40-44, 
it is held to be necessary that the third person 
who deals with the agent be ignorant of the fact 
that the agent lacks authority to act and that the 
principal be permitted to repudiate the act if he 
chooses so to do.'' 
And the following from the case of Allen v. Green-
land Oil Company, 256 P., 1004: 
"The doctrine of ratification of an agent's 
unauthorized agreements implies the existence 
of at least two essential elements: (a) that the 
party contracting with the agent did not know the 
agent lacked authority to make the agreement, 
and (b) that the principal had the privilege of re-
pudiating the unauthorized agreement, if he did 
not choose to ratify it." 
This shows conclusively that our contention that the 
disloyalty of Ball in concealing all the facts of this al-
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leged lease removed him as the agent of the owners 
respecting his dealings with the defendant, all of which 
were based upon concealment. Otherwise, how can the 
basis of ratification, as shown in section (a) of the Allen 
v. Greenland Oil Company case depend upon the defend-
ant knowing that the agent lacked the authority, because 
here he is presumed to have known and it is the same as 
if he knew and, therefore, it was a deal between Ball and 
the defendant so long as the facts were kept from the 
owners. True, they received the rent from Floor, and 
Floor received a big value .for every dollar he paid for 
rent. 
Other authorities holding that the rule imputing 
agent's knowledge to the principals does not apply when 
the third party knew that the agent in the original con-
tract did not have authority to make the contract are: 
Jenkins-Renfro 66 S. E. 212, 25 L. 
R. A., N. S., 231 
]deacharn, Agency, sec. 721 
3 C. J. S., p. 218, sec. 280 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hilton, 241 
U. S. 613, 60 L. Ed. 202 
]dillincarnp v. Willenberg, 169 N. \V. 
100 
]dcCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 
163 
Scripture v. Scottish American, 49 
s. w. 644 
(b) The defendant has pleaded that he expended 
$1,000.00 in permanent improvements and the lease pro-
vided that in order to be entitled to a renewal it was 
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necessary for him to haYe expended $1,000.00 in perman-
ent iinprovements on or before lVIay 1, 1935. 
Permanent improvements necessarily means those 
improvements "~hich pern1anently affect the building, 
and not merely such in1provements as are convenient for 
the use of a particular tenant or which will be used up or 
worn out during the period of the tenancy. The defend-
ant has made proof of large expenditures but he has 
failed to segregate trade improvements, or improvements 
"\Yhich will be worn out during his tenancy, from the 
permanent improvements. The court overruled plain-
tiffs' objections on these grounds. (Ab. 91, Assignment 
of Error 21, Ab. 117). The clear duty rests upon the 
defendant to make this segregation. The defendant in-
troduced the following bills : 
The Granite Mill and Fixture Co. (Exhibit 32, Ab. 
91), for a large number of items for a total of $820.00, 
including a new floor, which we admit was necessary, but 
when defendant decided to conduct a dance hall, it re-
quired a maple floor, 12 x 22 feet, which had to be 
smoothed and sanded twice. When the license for danc-
ing was not renewed, defendant put linoleum over the 
maple floor. At first fir flooring was ordered and then 
changed to maple: it added the exchange cost $15.00 
(A b. 102, 104). 
The toilet was on the main floor. ''I thought for my 
business I would rather have it downstairs.'' 
Then there were two stairways, one in the southeast 
corner, which was enlarged, and leads to a ladies' rest 
room which defendant installed, and an opening in the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
floor was cut in the west side and a stairway constructed 
to the men's toilet. The framework for these toilets 
could be removed. The opening and the stairway on the 
east side was not used. 
We submit that moving the toilet downstairs and 
making a place for a new stairway instead of using the 
old one are alterations to suit the tenant's desire, and not 
permanent improvements. The linoleum on the floor and 
the carpet on the stairway, which was charged in the bill, 
were worn out and had been removed. (Ab. 102, 103). 
The trap placed under the bar to catch the water from 
the bar and the 50 to 60 feet of 2-inch pipe leading t~J 
the sewer was included. A paneling was placed around 
the room and the same paneling was placed in an old 
closet owned by Floor at the north end of the bar, and 
included in the cost. When defendant went in there was 
a partition dividing the front from the back. It was 7 or 
8 feet high with a square opening. ''I wanted to increase 
the size of the dance hall, so I moved the partition north 
about 3 feet and built it higher up to the ceiling, with 
swinging doors, making a complete separation of the 
rooms," at a cost of $85.00. The swinging doors arc 
stored in the basement. To suit its convenience, the de-
fendant changed the transom. (Ab. 104). 
Bernardi's Electric Company bill (Exhibit 34, Ab. 
93, 105, 112) .. This bill was for $181.85. It is a question 
whether any of it was for a permanent improvement, as 
it was really a trade convenience. New wiring in conduit 
was necessitated by defendant's installing an air com-
pressor; electric lights were installed in ten booths with 
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\Yire in conduit leading to each booth. There 'vere 7 chan-
deliers--4 in front and three in the back (Ab.105). Floor 
said he could ren1ove lighting fixtures, worth $52.50. We 
submit that the 10 branches and outlets for the booths 
'\vould be a large part of the balance of the costs. The de-
fendant failed to show what he had done with the old 
lights. 
It " ... as clearly the duty of the defendant to segre-
gate the costs, "\vhich "\vere not permanent improvements. 
\\T e submit that the other bills, except Elias Morris 
& Sons Company, are not, in any sense for permanent 
improvements. 
As to Exhibit 35, bill of Spere Tent & Awning Com-
pany for two awnings (Ab. 94), Floor testified that they 
are good for three or four years yet. (A b. 105). 
Exhibit 36, linoleum and carpet, $64.14. The lino-
leum was glued to the floor (A b. 94). ''The linoleum is 
pretty well worn now. I am going to put in another one 
soon.'' The 9 ~ yards of stair carpet and pads for 15 
steps, amounting to $17.90, is worn out. (A b. 105, 106). 
Exhibit 37, exterior painting done April 14, 1934, 
$61.00 (Ab. 95, 106). The incidental items for approxi-
mately $80.00 (Exhibit 40), described on pages 95 and 
96 of the abstract, for painting, paper, paper-hanging, 
etc. are not allowable, because it was admitted that the 
painting and papering with these materials was done in 
1934, and has been covered over with new paint and 
paper. (A b. 106). Also screen doors, costing $23.49, are 
included with $6.01 for lumber, but clearly these are not 
permanent improvements (Ab. 106). 
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Exhibit 38, cement on floor of gent's lavatory, which 
was trade fixture (A b. 95). 
Objection was made that the foregoing testimony 
was irrelevant and immaterial, and the cost of the 
various items was not segregated and many of them were 
not permanent improvements. We have assigned the rul-
ing of the trial court as error in Assignment No. 21, Ab. 
117. 
It is impossible to ascertain how much was paid for 
permanent improvements. The defendant 1ias failed 
to furnish evidence on this, and Ball, having concealed 
from his principals all the facts in regard to defendant's 
lease, had no authority to pass upon and approve same. 
As to the character of these improvements, and that 
they were not permanent improvements within the provi-
sions of the void lease, we refer to the case of Price v. 
Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, and we quote from page 
771 as follows : 
''Generally speaking, the improvements, 
especially the papering of the rooms, the inside 
painting, much of the fencing, the chicken coops, 
and the like, are not such as have a substantial or 
permanent character, or as beneficial to the free-
hold; but they are such as are merely for the 
ordinary convenience and comfort in the use and 
occupation of the premises.'' 
(c) Let us assume that the positions were reversed 
-that the original owners, with full knowledge, had 
ratified the lease and the defendant refused to pay the 
rent and he was sued for the rent. Could he not plead 
that he was not liable; that there was no written agree-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
ment by hin1 to pay rent after the first three-year period; 
that any alleged extension \Yas in parol and, therefore, 
he would not be liable J? 
The authorities are son1ewhat divided on this subject 
but the following authorities hold that such plea would be 
open to defendant: 
JA~fES, on Option Contracts, section 414: 
"~ \Vhere the option contract or offer falls 
within a particular or special statute, the char-
acter and sufficiency of the election, or accept-
ance, required must be determined by reference to 
the provisions of that statute. 
Thus, the Alabama statute provides that a 
contract for the sale of land, etc. is void unless 
the purchase money, or a portion thereof, be paid 
and the purchaser be put into possession of the 
land by the seller. The owner of land gave a 
\Yritten lease with option to the lessee to pur-
chase. An election to purchase under the option 
was made by the agent of the lessee whose author-
ity to do so was not in writing as required by the. 
statute, and it was held that since neither part 
of the purchase money was paid, nor possession 
taken under the option, the election, in law being 
oral, was insufficient." 
In speaking of an oral notice of extension, Judge 
Cooley in the case of Veller v. Robinson, 15 N. W., 448 
(Mich.) said : 
"But the difficulty with this agreement is, 
that it makes an extension for three years de-
pendent for its creation and existence on a mere 
oral understanding.'' 
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VI. 
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
The alleged lease provides, (A b. 12), "and either 
party agrees to pay all costs and attorney fees and ex-
penses incurred by the other that sha~l arise from enforc-
ing the covenants of this lease.'' 
The plaintiffs denied any liability for attorneys' 
fees. (Ab. 99, 117). The court, in its finding No. 9 (Ab. 
36) and in its judgment (Ab. 40, 41), allowed the defend-
ant $500.00 as an attorney's fee. The plaintiffs have as-
signed as error such finding and judgment (Ab. 120, 121). 
The plaintiffs submit that the court erred in such 
finding and judgment, because: 
(a) There is no privity between the plaintiffs and 
the defendant and the provision for attorneys' fee was 
not a covenant running with the land. 
The alleged lease purports to be between ''The 
Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha, the W. P. 
Noble Company, both corporations, and the Fred Bragg 
Estate, all by A. H. Ball, as Agent, as Lessors, and the 
defendant, as lessee. (A b. 12, 14). Of the lessors, only 
one, to wit, theW. P. Noble Company, had any interest in 
the property. The real owners conveyed the property to 
the plaintiffs on the 31st day of May, 1939 and war-
ranted immediate possession (Ab. 66, 67), and there was 
no provision that the grantees (the plaintiffs) took the 
property subject to the lease. The plaintiffs immedi-
ately, on June 2, 1939, notified the defendant to vacate 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
39 
the pre1nises (-A.b. 3, 4) and follo"'ed \Yith this suit for 
unla,vful detainer. There is no contract bet,veen plain-
tiffs and defendant; they are strangers. The defendant 
claims possession under an alleged contract which names 
only one of the o"11ers of the property or of plaintiffs' 
grantors. The provision for attorneys' fee in the alleged 
contract is not a covenant running with the land, so as 
to make the purchaser of the land liable on a contract, 
though he is not a party to it. It in no wise touches or 
concerns the land or its use. It is purely a personal cove-
nant. 
We quote from the case of Hollander v. Central 
Metal, 23 L. R. A. (NS) 1135, 71 Atl. 442, the following: 
"In Glen v. Canby, 24 Md. 127, the court stated as 
the established doctrine, 'that a covenant to run with 
the land must extend to the land, so that the thing re-
quired to be done will affect the quality, value or mode 
of enjoying the estate conveyed, and thus constitute a 
condition annexed or appurtenant to it; there must also 
be a privity of estate between the contracting parties, 
and the covenant must be consistent with the estate to 
which it adheres, and of such a character that the estate 
will not be defeated or changed by a performance of it.' 
This is the doctrine asserted by Mr. Poe in 1 Poe Pl. & 
Pr. 1st ed. 253, and reiterated by this court in Whalen 
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 108 Md. 11, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
130, 69 Atl. 390. In Taylor's Landlord and Tenant, 7th 
ed. sec. 261, it is said that, 'in order that a covenant may 
run with the land, its performance or non-performance 
must affect the nature, quality, or value of the property 
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demised, independent of collateral circumstances, or must 
affect the mode of enjoyment. It must not only concern 
the land, but there must also be a privity of estate be-
tween the contracting parties.' 
'In order that a covenant may run with the land-
that is, that its benefit or obligation may pass with the 
ownership-it must respect the thing granted or demised, 
and the act covenanted to be done or omitted must con-
cern the land or estate conveyed. Whether a covenant 
will or will not run with the land does not, however, so 
much depend on whether it is to be performed on the 
land itself, as on whether it tends directly or necessarily 
to enhance its value or render it more beneficial and con-
venient to those by whom it is owned or occupied; for, if 
this be the case, every successive assignee of the land will 
be entitled to enforce the covenant.' 11 Cyc. 1080. 
'Such covenants, and such only, run with land as 
concern the land itself, in whosesoever hands it may be, 
and become united with, and form a part of, the consider-
ation for which the land, or some interest in it, is parted 
with, between the covenantor and covenantee.' Wash b. 
Real Prop., sec. 1205. '' 
We have cited many authorities laying down the 
general rule. We have made search through the digests 
and other sources and found no case where it has ever 
been claimed that a provision for attorneys' fee runs 
with the land. 
We cite a few cases which come more nearly con-
cerning the land than does attorneys' fee, and which the 
courts hold do not run with the land: 
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In the case of Cohen v. Buns, 170 N. Y. S., 560, one 
Sidn1an \Y-eiss leased to B. Cohen for 10 years. Plaintiff 
Cohen deposited "~ith \Yeiss $400 as security for the 
performanc-e of the lease. Seven years later \\T eiss sold to 
Buns, husband of defendant. He agreed to pay to plain-
tiff. He conYeyed property to his "\vife as a gift. Plain-
tiff demanded the deposit fron1 "vife. 
Held: The covenant in the lease to repay the deposit 
was a personal covenant upon the part of the then owner 
of the premises and did not run with the land. There was 
no privity of covenant or contract between plaintiff and 
defendant and no evidence of any promise on the part of 
the defendant to pay it, nor is there any evidence that she 
assumed the obligation when she accepted the deed of the 
premises. Under such circumstances the judgment can-
not be sustained. Knulsen v. Craque, 99 N.Y.S. 911. 
In the case of Magoon v. Eastman, 84 Atl. 869, a 
lease of a farm required the lessee to leave as much hay 
as there was on the farm when he took possession. He 
left the required amount but some of it was not cut in 
proper season and was therefor of less value than it 
otherwise would have been. 
Held, that the lessee's obligation concerning the hay 
was not a covenant running with the land, but was a 
mere personal obligation and, hence, an action of cove-
nant could not be maintained by the lessor's assignee 
for breach thereof. 
"It is claimed that the plaintiff, as successor 
in interest to the lessor, was entitled- to the re-
quired amount of hay properly and seasonably 
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harvested, according to the rule of good hus-
bandry. This may be so, but the question here is 
whether he can recover the damage in an action of 
covenant brought in his own name. We think the 
defendant's obligation concerning the hay is not 
one that touches or concerns the land. The agree-
ment to return was a personal obligation." 
''If a covenant in a lease will be for the bene-
fit either of the landlord or tenant by reason of 
its relation to the land, it concerns the land so as 
to run with it." 
Bailey v. Walker & Co. 290 F. 282 
''A covenant in a lease giving the lessee an 
option to lease other lands from the lessor is 
purely collateral and could not run with the land, 
even against heirs, when named in the instrument, 
since the necessary privity is absent.'' 
Watts v. Bowen, 139 N. E. 658 
"A provision in a lease limiting liability of 
lessor for damages sustained by tenant to one 
month's rent does not run with the land and the 
original lessor's grantor cannot enforce it." 
Strong v. Woodard I. Co., 158 N.Y.S. 
513 
"A covenant of the lessor to buy, at the term-
ination of the lease, the buildings remaining on 
the premises is personal to the lessor and does not 
run with the land, nor bind her heirs or legatees." 
In re: Kenshaw, 75 N. Y. S. 1047 
Etowah M. Co. v. Willis Valley, etc. 
25 So. 720 
(b) The attorneys' services rendered in this case 
is not within the terms of the contract. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
The defendant, in order to justify his possession, 
claimed under the alleged lease. The plaintiffs denied 
there 'Yas any lease. This made the issue; that is, was 
there a lease~ The services of the defendant's attorneys 
was rendered in attempting to establish that the defend-
ant held a valid lease. The lower court found the defend-
ant has a valid lease. Defendant did not attempt to sus-
tain any covenant of the lease, but only, was there a 
lease. As to the pro:vision for the extension, the defend-
ant attempted to prove only that it had complied with a 
condition of the lease entitling it to the extension. The 
defendant did not agree to expend $1,000.00 in improve-
ments. The lease says, ''For and in consideration of the 
expenditure by the lessee in permanent improvements in 
and on said store and basement to the extent of $1,000.00, 
* * * * an option, under the same terms as herein set 
forth, for an additional 5 years is hereby granted * * * * 
said option to be exercised on or before 30 days prior to 
the expiration of 3 years * * * * In case said option is 
exercised, the rent shall be $90.00 per month.'' 
It is to be noted that the defendant in no wise agreed 
to make any improvements. So the provision for an 
extension was conditional, (1) on the improvements 
having been made; (2) in the election of the defendant. 
The defendant attempted to establish, and the lower 
court held it did, that it performed both conditions. This 
was in line with the whole issue-did the defendant hold 
a lease~ If its lease was valid, then there was no ques-
tion as to its covenants. 
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This case comes within the principle enunciated by 
this court in: 
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah, 137, 292 
P. 206 (10) 
Leone, et al, v. Zuniga, 34 P. (2d) 
699 (3) 84 Utah 417 
Brandley v. Lewis, 92 P. ( 2d) 338 
VII. 
THE ·FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND JUDGMENT ARE ERRONEOUS 
The plaintiffs have assigned error to each finding of 
fact, except finding No. 4. (Assignments Nos. 29 to 36, 
A b. 118, 120). 
As to Finding No. 1, Assignment of Error No. 29, 
(A b. 118), states fully our objection. 
Findings Nos. 2 and 3 seem to be based on insuffi-
ciency of allegations in the complaint. The defendant 
entered the premises under a void lease. We quote the 
syllabus from Utah Loan & Trust Co. v. Garbutt, 6 Utah 
142, 23 P. 758: 
"Under 2 Comp. Laws Utah 1888, sec. 3916, 
requiring a lease for more than one year to be in 
writing, and, if made by an agent, requiring the 
agent's authority in writing, one of six executors 
having no written authority from any of the 
others, cannot make a lease for more than one 
year,.a majority being required for any valid act 
by section 4030. 
The acceptance of rent under a lease void 
under the statutes of frauds creates only a ten-
ancy from month to month, the rent being payable 
monthly.'' 
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The rule is universal that when a person occupies 
premises under a lease void under the statute of frauds, 
in collecting the rent for the occupation the terms of the 
lease "'ill control. 35 C. J. 1028, 1124, sec. 344. 
Finding No. 3. As to this the assignment of error 
No. 32, (Ab. 118), sets forth fully the objections except 
Cluff was employed by Ball as attorney and the employ-
ment "~as not ratified by the predecessors. 
Finding No. 6, (Assignment of Error No. 33, Ab. 
118), points out this finding is contrary to the evidence 
in finding that ~layme Noble visited the premises several 
times while the improvements were being made. Floor 
testified : ''These changes had been made and the tile 
work done when Miss Noble came down." (Ab. 97,110). 
\\T e have discussed the other matters elsewhere in 
this brief, except the finding that the plaintiffs had 
knowledge of the lease. This is immaterial. The war-
ranty deed they received warranting immediate posses-
sion was a repudiation of any claim by any person for 
any lease on, or for any part of, the Eagle Block extend-
ing beyond May 31, 1939, the day the premises were con-
veyed to them, and they being privy to the grantors have 
the right to plead the statute of frauds. 
Collins v. Lacky, 123 P. 1118, 40 L. 
R. A. (N.S.) 885 and annotation; 
Givens v. Mason, 266 S. W. 7; 
Hansen v. Buttison, 27 N. W. 423; 
Bank v. Bank, 114 N. W. 409. 
As to finding No. 7, and assignment of .error No. 
34, we amend the assignment by making it as follows: 
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'' 34. The court erred in making Finding No. 7, be-
cause the evidence shows that no notice of the exercise 
of the option was given to A. H. Ball, and A. H. Ball, 
having given the lease without authority, notice to him 
would not be notice to his principals, and there was no 
written notice of the acceptance of the extension signed 
by the defendant." 
We have argued these points elsewhere. 
As to finding No. 8 and assignment of error No. 35, 
we amend the assignment of error to read as follows: 
'' 35. The court erred in making Finding No. 8, 
beeause the matter of good faith upon the part of the de-
fendant was not an issue in the case, and further, the 
defendant knew, or should have known, that his lease had 
no written authorization from the owners.'' 
Finding No. 9 grants the attorneys' fee, and assign-
ment of error No. 36 (Ab. 120), we amend to read as 
follows: 
'' 36. The court erred in making Finding No. 9, be-
cause the matter of attorneys' fee was not an issue, as 
the plaintiffs did not agree to pay any attorneys' fee, 
and this suit does not come within the terms of the con-
tract entitling the defendant to attorneys' fee.'' 
We discuss this question elsewhere. 
The lower court, having adopted the wrong theory 
of both the facts and the law, and the findings being er-
roneous, it necessarily follovvs that the conclusions of law 
and judgment are erroneous. The plaintiffs' assignments 
Nos. 37 to 42, (A b. 120) are to the erroneous conclusions 
and judgment. 
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In conclusion, the alleged lease was void under the 
statute of frauds, and because it \vas not executed in the 
names of all of the owners; and the permanent improve-
ments were not sufficient to meet the conditions of the 
alleged lease, and the defendant did not bind himself for 
the extension period, and the plain tiffs are not liable for 
any attorneys' fee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN T. SANFORD, 
E. A. ROGERS, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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